Reinfection with influenza A virus was studied by measuring hemagglutination-inhibiting antibody responses to infection in paired sera taken from groups of soldiers and students. Among 62 soldiers severely infected during the first wave of the A/Asian/57 (H2N2) pandemic in 1957, 17 were asymptomatically reinfected with the same virus within six months. In the 1962 epidemic the rate increased to 41%. Among reinfected soldiers studied, 68% had an asymptomatic infection; only 10% were severely symptomatic, and they were found to be infected with a virus closely related to A/Asian/57. For H3N2 epidemics, the rate of reinfection was 17% among students studied in 1970 who were reinfected with a virus closely related to the prototype A/Hong Kong/68 (H3N2). Reinfection with an extremely drifted variant of H3N2 was found to be 32% and 69% in two groups of students studied in 1972. Reinfection with a related virus was 32% in another group studied in 1983. Among the students studied who were reinfected with H3N2 viruses, the rates of asymptomatic infection were similar to those of symptomatic infection. The reinfection rates with a virus related to A/USSR/77 (H1N1) were 9.3% and 20% in two groups studied in 1980.
The high degrees of infectivity and transmissibility of influenza A viruses among susceptible populations are well-known properties of these agents. Less well known is the degree to which reinfection occurs. This aspect of influenza epidemiology was discussed infrequently before 1972 [1, 2] . Since then more reports have become available [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
To examine the immunologic and epidemiological factors associated with reinfection, we undertook a review of the experience of nine groups of subjects during the A/Asian/57 (H2N2), A/Hong Kong/68 (H3N2), and A/USSR/77 (H1N1) pandemic and interpandemic periods. Though the present study concentrated on juveniles and young adults in closed populations, an improved understanding of reinfection and its virological and clinical consequences will help clarify the basis of immunity to influenza A infections.
This study was greatly facilitated by the fact that since the A/Asian pandemic, surveillance of influenza virus in Japan has been nationwide in scope. Every year the antigens of viruses isolated in the 47 prefectures in Japan are analyzed for antigenic variation. In addition, every year since 1960 field studies on inactivated influenza vaccines have been performed by the Influenza Vaccine Research Group.
Subjects and Methods
Subjects. A description of the populations evaluated in this study is shown in table 1. Nine populations were observed for extended periods beginning in 1957 and ending in 1983. The nine groups studied were all young adult populations; three groups consisted of military recruits and six groups, students. These individuals were evaluated serologically and clinically.
Group 1 was comprised of soldiers from one camp who had severe symptomatic infections with influenza A (H2N2) during the first wave of A/Asian/57 (H2N2), which appeared in Japan beginning 10 May 1957 [10] and in this camp, 6 June 1957 [11, 12] ; subjects in this group volunteered for the study in the middle of June. During the period of observation a second wave of A/Asian/57 occurred in this camp between October and December 1957. Serum samples were collected from this group of soldiers seven times.
Group 2 was also comprised of soldiers from a single camp. An epidemic attributed to a virus closely related to the prototype A/Asian/57 occurred in this camp (in the center of Tokyo) between February and March 1962 [13] . In early January, serum samples had been taken from all 713 regiment soldiers for testing for syphilis. From this group, 464 soldiers agreed to be followed up and were tested after the epidemic to determine their titers of HAI antibody. During the epidemic, soldiers who were sick were evaluated for clinical manifestations of influenza. After the epidemic, clinical data were related to serological evidence of infection with the A/Asian/57 virus.
Group 3 was comprised of 97 healthy soldiers at a camp in the suburb of Tokyo whose pre-and postepidemic serum samples were collected by random sampling (the medical staff did not send the sera of seriously infected persons to us because of a communication gap) [14] . Groups 4 through 7B were comprised of subjects who had all received monovalent vaccine for influenza B as a control for those who received a vaccine for influenza A.
Group 8 was comprised of students who had not received any influenza vaccine for more than three years because of side effects or for other reasons. Pre-and postepidemic serum samples, however, were collected from all members of this group, along with the vaccinees, to examine for HAI antibodies.
Method of surveillance. Groups 1, 2, and 3 were not vaccinated. The subjects in these populations were examined for illness on a regular basis by the military medical officers.
Since the autumn of 1962, r' , 80 070-90 07o of Japanese students have received commercial, killed influenza vaccine annually in accordance with the recommendation of the Japanese government. In addition, the Welfare Ministry recommends that prefectural governments conduct surveys for serological evidence of infectious diseases, including influenza, rubella, measles, and other agents. For influenza, the surveillance consists of the measurements of HAI antibody in sera taken from infants, pupils, students, and adult volunteers during the interepidemic periods. During influenza epidemics, acute-and convalescent-phase sera are also taken routinely from affected individuals in every prefecture and their HAI titers measured.
In Japan, collection of three serum specimens in field trials is routinely carried out. The following collection schedule was used for groups 4 through 7B: just before vaccination (end of October or November), four to five weeks after vaccination (December or early January; preepidemic), and four to five weeks after the epidemic (end of March or April; postepidemic). Because epidemics due to H3N2 or H1N1 virus occurred during these periods, it was possible to observe the efficacy of influenza A vaccines and also the rate of reinfection with influenza A virus among recipients of the vaccine for influenza B.
Self-administered questionnaires were given to all subjects in groups 1, 2, 6, and 8, whenever influenzalike illness occurred during the epidemics. Those individuals more seriously affected visited doctors and responded to the questionnaires along with the doctor's diagnosis. Slightly ill subjects did not always respond to the questionnaire. As a result, differences in the number of influenza-like illnesses and infections were significant.
In groups 4, 5, 7A, and 7B, questionnaires were not used. Therefore, in these groups only serological evidence of reinfection was studied.
The clinical definition of influenza used throughout the study was a febrile (37.5 C) respiratory illness lasting more than one day and associated with at least one of the following symptoms: chills, sore throat, headache, or muscle aches. Those individuals with a body temperature 38.5 C were defined as seriously infected with influenza, and those who did not manifest any symptoms were considered asymptomatic. In addition, those with just slight symptoms and who attended schools or worked in camps as usual were considered to be well.
Serological methods and procedures for the isolation of virus.
Sera were incubated with four volumes of receptor-destroying enzyme (Vibrio cholerae) in tubes or on plastic plates at 37 C for 18 hr and then heated at 56 C for 1 hr. Serial dilutions of 0.25 ml of treated serum were incubated with equal volumes of influenza virus containing four units of HA. After incubation at room temperature for 1 hr, 0.5 ml of fowl red blood cells was added to each tube or well, and the results were noted after red cell sedimentation. The HAI titer was defined as the highest initial serum dilution that completely inhibited HA. (Because of the use of the highest final serum dilution for expression of the titer in Japan, a titer of 1:64 in this report is equivalent to a titer of 1:16 in articles from the United States or European countries.)
The pre-and postepidemic serum samples from each individual were tested simultaneously (as a pair) for HAI antibodies. The A/Kumamoto/1/72 strain exhibited considerable antigenic drift from the prototype A/Hong Kong (A/Aichi) virus (figure 1), but it was not widespread and caused only local outbreaks in Asia [15] . In Japan particularly, 85% (195 of 229) of isolated viruses were the same as the Kumamoto strain, and 1968-1969 and 1969-1970 . The report showed that the total number of pupils in public schools who were absent during the first epidemic in each prefecture in Kyushu was about half of those in the second epidemic, including group 4. This result coincided with our previous reports [21, 22] . Therefore, a large number of susceptibles remained after the first epidemic and were infected during the second epidemic. That the reinfection rate (17 010) was low despite the rather large epidemic may be due to the short lapse of time after the first exposure and also to a small antigenic drift.
Characteristics of infection with a major variant virus within a short interval among those previously infected with the prototoye and closely related H3N2 viruses. Groups 5 and 6 were exposed to two epidemics that were due to the prototype H3N2 virus Before the A/Kumamoto epidemic, the proportion of subjects with preepidemic HAI titers <1:16 against A/Fukuoka was only 5.3% of 858 subjects in group 5, whereas against A/Kumamoto it was 54 010. This fact indicates that the antigenic drift of the A/Kumamoto strain from the prototype was significant. After the A/Kumamoto/72 epidemic, the overall rate of serological infection in group 5 was almost the same as that after the A/Fukuoka/70 epidemic in group 4. However, the rate of reinfection in group 4 in 1970 was far less than the rate of fourfold or greater rises in HAI titers among those previously infected with preceding strains during the A/Kumamoto epidemic in group 5 in 1972.
Although group 6 consisted of 85 resident students, five or six individuals lived together in neighboring rooms on each floor of the dormitory building. Before the A/Kumamoto epidemic, the proportion of those students with preepidemic HAI titers <1:16 against A/Fukuoka and A/Kumamoto strains was almost the same as that of group 5 (7 010 and 45%, respectively).
After the A/Kumamoto epidemic, the overall rate of infection was very high, and the rate of fourfold or greater rises in HAI titer against A/Kumamoto during the epidemic among those with preepidemic HAI titers >1:32 was 69 070 (22 of 32) . In addition, nine students were proved to have had preepidemic HAI titers >1:32 against A/Fukuoka and <1:16 against A/Kumamoto, and their titers rose fourfold or more against A/Kumamoto during the epidemic. Thus, the rate of infection became 97 010 (31 of 32).
These high rates of serological infection should be attributed to the major antigenic drift of the prevailing virus as well as to living conditions in this dormitory, which might have facilitated the spread of the virus.
In the epidemic, 17 students were seriously ill and had to miss classes. Eight of these had preepidemic HAI titers (against A/Fukuoka) <1:16, whereas the other nine (29%) students who had titers >1:32 were infected with A/Kumamoto virus. Of 31 students previously infected with preceding strains, 22 (71%) did not miss classes during the epidemic. These facts suggested that less than one-third of previously infected students experienced severe infection with the variant, and the remaining two-thirds were only very slightly or asymptomatically reinfected.
Reinfection with a closely related H1N1 virus. Groups 7A and 7B were involved in the epidemic that was due to a closely related H1N1 The rate of the latter in group 7A was 9.3% and in group 7B, 20%.
Characteristics of infection with a variant H3N2 virus among those exposed several times to various H3N2 viruses. Group 8 probably was exposed to many H3N2 variants, e.g., A/Victoria/75, A/Texas/77, and A/Bangkok/79, because large epidemics due to these viruses occurred in 1976, 1978, and 1980, respectively, in most schools in Japan. Since sporadic cases occurred in 1981 and an epidemic due only to B virus occurred in 1982, this group had no exposure to H3N2 virus for three years. Both the total rate of infection with and the rate of fourfold or greater rises in HAI titer against the prevalent (closely related to A/Philippines/82) virus among those with the preepidemic HAI titers >1:32 to previous H3N2 virus were higher. The results should be considered to be due to antigenic drift and to the rather long lapse of time from the last exposure to an H3N2 virus.
Of 10 reinfected individuals, three were judged to be seriously affected (temperature >38 C), two others mildly affected, and five did not manifest any symptoms of illness.
Discussion
Studies on reinfection with type A influenza (H3N2 and H1N1) virus have been increasing recently [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . The present study attempted to extend these observations by reviewing six epidemics due to three subtypes of influenza A virus (H2N2, H3N2, and H1N1) through measurement of HAI titers of paired sera taken before and after the epidemics from juveniles and young adults in closed populations in Japan.
Two notable features were represented by the observations of reinfection with the same H2N2 virus. First, reinfection with the virus occurred at a comparatively high rate within just six months. Second, none of those who were reinfected had symptoms. Our previous report indicated reinfections with the same virus in the second wave in three populations [10] . These facts clearly demonstrate that reinfection can occur within a very short period.
An interesting fact was observed in the H3N2 subtype era. The extremely high rate of infection with a variant virus during the 1972 epidemic was obtained from those subjects who experienced one exposure to the prototype A/Aichi/68 and one more exposure to a related virus just one or two years before the appearance of the variant, which represented an antigenically significant difference between the two previous viruses.
Comparing one set of observations of reinfection with another is difficult because of the variability in epidemiological factors and in methods used. However, almost all the rates of reinfection with each subtype virus obtained in this study were higher than were found in previous reports [1, 2, 26, 27] , except for those found by the Influenza Research Unit in the United Kingdom and by groups in Seattle and Houston [3, 4, 8, 9] .
These high rates of reinfection appear to be due to the following factors. First, symptomatic and asymptomatic cases were investigated in this study by the titration of paired sera of all individuals; second, the subjects were mostly young people [3, 4, 10, 15] ; third, the subjects were characterized by living in rather or extremely crowded populations such as schools, military camps, and dormitories where there are high rates of exposure; fourth, there was a large degree of antigenic drift in groups 5 and 6; and fifth, the interval between exposures, i.e., the fall in titer of antibody in the period before reinfection in groups 2, 3, and 8.
These very high rates of reinfection are far different than those observed in Seattle and Houston, where variable rates were presented. The reason for the difference between their rates and ours should be attributed to the variability of age, density of population, and antigenic drift to sequential virus. However, the extemely high rates of second infection mentioned above are clearly due to extremely high rates of exposure as well as to major antigenic drift.
Davies et al. [8] also reported extremely high rates of reinfection in boarding schools. This must have come from the high rate of exposure, as happened in our group 6. However, the rate of reinfection with a closely related virus was not as high as in our study [2, [26] [27] [28] .
Earlier studies by one of the authors (T. S.) indicated that the rate of primary infection with symptoms vs. that without symptoms during the first outbreaks due to new subtypes was 10:1 or 20:1 [29, 30] . However, the rate was reversed in the reinfections in this study. Similar results were obtained by Davies et al. [8] .
In this report the rate of asymptomatic cases among reinfected individuals was high (100% of 17 and 68% of 78) in two epidemics due to the same or to closely related H2N2 viruses. Those rates in two epidemics caused by a variant H3N2 virus were also rather high (61% of 31, and 50% of 10).
In this connection, it should be taken into consideration that Japanese pupils do not attach much importance to upper-respiratory-tract diseases. They do not visit doctors but continue to attend school if the symptoms are slight. However, Davies et al. [8] reported that only nine of 23 reinfected individuals had symptoms. These results in the United Kingdom and in Japan suggest that the rate of asymptomatic reinfection may possibly be higher in some populations than the rate reported in other studies.
In this study, we define reinfection as fourfold rises in HAI titers during each epidemic among only those with preepidemic HAI titers 1:32; those with titers of 1:16 were excluded. Nevertheless, among the latter there may be some individuals whose HAI titers had increased after a previous infection but then fallen to <1:16 before the epidemic because of the time lapse (figure 2). The number of these persons might have increased as time went by. If they are added to our results, and if other methods such as CF, neuraminidase inhibition, ELISA, or isolation of virus were used, the rates of reinfection would be even higher than those shown in the present study.
In order to determine the real rate of reinfection, however, we must undertake large-scale longitudinal observations of various populations, such as the three groups mentioned above [6, 9, 28] , that include analysis of host, virus, and environmental aspects [9] , as well as cross-sectional studies of many populations.
